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THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS
FOR INVALIDATING STATE LEGISLATION
The contract clause of the United States Constitution' has been the
subject of speculation as to whether it could provide any basis for
prohibiting state legislative action.2 Until recently, this speculation was
well deserved.' Two cases decided by the Supreme Court in 19774 and
1978,1 however, should put an end to the idea that the contract clause is
a "dead letter." In these cases, the Supreme Court has revitalized the
contract clause, both by showing that these prohibitions retain some
potence and by broadening the scope and application of the clause's
prohibitions, even when construed as limited by the reserved powers of
the state.6
This comment begins with an analysis of the historical development
of the contract clause and the Court's development of contract clause
protections. This development is then compared with the development
of the due process clause of the Constitution to demonstrate the consis-
tencies in the Court's treatment of economic interests under both con-
stitutional provisions. An examination of two recent Supreme Court
decisions follows to demonstrate the change in the scope of contract
clause protections affected by the Court's analysis and to examine its
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The contract clause provides that: "No State shall...
pass any. . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."
2. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 517 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting)
(dissenting from "the Court's balancing away the plain guarantee of Art. I § 10"); H. CHASE
& C. DUCAT, CORWIN'S THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 105 (1974 ed.)
("Today the clause is of negligible importance, and might well be stricken from the Consti-
tution. For most practical purposes, in fact, it has been.").
3. The last Supreme Court case, prior to 1977, to hold state action unconstitutional as
violative of the contract clause is Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362 (1941) (1937 repeal of 1935
Arkansas law protecting tax sale purchasers from attack on procedural irregularities).
4. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
5. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
6. Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power must be consistent with the fair
intent of the constitutional limitation of that power. The reserved power cannot be
construed so as to destroy the limitation, nor is the limitation to be construed to destroy
the reserved power in its essential aspects. They must be construed in harmony with
each other.
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 439 (1934).
Reserved power is that power the state retains to act in the general welfare. Reserved
power exercises are often characterized as police power exercises (although the reserved
power also includes power of eminent domain). The terms will, therefore, be used in-
terchangably. Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905), first recognized that contract
clause prohibitions are subject to reserved power exercises.
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effect on future litigation. Finally, the contract clause as presently in-
terpreted is compared with the due process clause to demonstrate that
economic interests now receive different treatment depending upon
how that interest is characterized.
I. BACKGROUND
4. Historical Interfpretation
It is generally acknowledged that the contract clause was adopted to
rectify economic conditions prevalent under the Articles of Confedera-
tion,7 although this purpose is not evident in the debates of the Consti-
tutional Convention.' Widespread economic depression existed
following the Revolutionary War, leading many states to enact debtor
relief statutes. These legislative schemes undermined confidence in the
economy and made prosperous trade impossible.9 Business persons
were unwilling to enter any transaction that involved credit because of
the propensity of state legislatures to abrogate later these credit agree-
ments by legislative fiat. The Framers sought to ensure stability for the
debtor-creditor relationship by adopting the contract clause, which
would prevent future state interference with debtor-creditor relation-
ships. The need for the clause is noted in Chief Justice Marshall's dis-
sent to Ogden . Saunders:
The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and creditor, of
interfering with contracts, a power which comes home to every man,
touches the interest of all, and controls the conduct of every individual in
those things which he supposes to be proper for his own exclusive man-
agement, had been used to such an excess by the State legislatures, as to
break in upon the ordinary intercourse of society, and destroy all confi-
dence between man and man. The mischief had become so great, so
alarming, as not only to impair commercial intercourse, and threaten the
existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the people, and destroy the
7. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (J. Madison) at 319 (Belknap Press 1966) ("Our own
experience has taught us, nevertheless, that additional fences against these dangers ought not
be omitted. Very properly, therefore, have the convention added this constitutional bulwark
in favor of personal security and private rights .. "); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blais-
dell, 290 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1934); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 354-55
(1827); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pt. 1), 57 HARV. L. REV. 512, 512-
13 (1944) [hereinafter cited as Hale].
8. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 439-41, 448-49, 597, 619,
636 (rev. ed. M. Farrand 1966).
9. See Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 256 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) ("The economic depression that followed the Revolutionary War witnessed 'an ignoble
array of [such State] legislative schemes'.") (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398, 427 (1934)).
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sanctity of private faith. To guard against the continuance of the evil was
an object of deep interest with all the truly wise, as well as the virtuous, of
this great community, and was one of the important benefits expected
from a reform of the government.'
0
Although, as adopted, the contract clause was intended to prevent
state legislative interference with debtor-creditor contracts, initial inter-
pretations of the clause did not confine its application to that limited
situation." Fletcher v. Peck,'2 the first case construing the contract
clause, extended the application of the clause's prohibitions to contracts
to which the state was a party. Fletcher involved a situation arising
from the great Yazoo land scandal. The state legislature had sought to
rescind land grants procured by bribery. The Court unanimously held
that the contract clause prohibited rescission of these land grants. In
doing so, the Court had to find that the clause applied to contracts to
which the state was a party, as well as to private contracts.'
3
Applicability of the clause to contracts to which the state was a party
was reaffirmed in Dartmouth College v. Woodward.4 In Dartmouth the
Court held that a corporate charter, such as the one issued to
Dartmouth College, was a contract, and that in the absence of an ex-
press reservation by the state of the power to modify, it could not be
impaired by state law without violating the contract clause.' 5
The early expansion of the contract clause's area of application was
accompanied by two decisions that limited the actual application of the
10. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 354-55 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
II. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 420 (1978); B.
WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 41-44 (1967). See, e.g.,
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (Georgia's repeal of land grant declared
unconstitutional); New Jersey v. Wilson, I I U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812) (repeal of act ex-
empting Indian land from tax liability declared void); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (act attempting to alter corporate charter is unconstitutional).
12. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). Chief Justice Marshall's opinion is permeated with
notions of "natural law." Fletcher can be read as striking down the state legislation on
either a contract clause or natural law basis. Justice Johnson's concurring opinion finds the
statute invalid on only a natural law basis. Id at 143. Natural law, a doctrine in great favor
in the nation's early history, was based on the concept that some rights, particularly property
rights, are immune from government legislation because these rights predate the government
and are essential to the continued existence of the government. See generally T. COOLEY,
THE GENERAL PRINCIPALS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Chapter XVI (3d ed. A. McLaughlin 1898); 2 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
(8th ed. Carrington 1927).
13. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 137.
14. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). See also New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164
(1812).
15. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 641. As a result of this decision states have consistently retained
the right to modify corporate charters. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 424 (1978).
1979]
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clause prohibitions. In Ogden v. Saunders,'6 the Court held that the
prohibitions of the clause extend only to legislation that retrospectively
affects the obligations of contract. As stated by the Court, "[tihe most
obvious and natural application . . . is to laws having a retrospective
operation upon existing contracts."' 7 The concept that a contract, at
least for contract clause purposes, includes the laws existing at the time
of its making is derived from Ogden. 8
Sturges v. Crowninshield'9 is responsible for the second limitation.
Sturges established that, for the purposes of contract clause litigation,
there is a distinction between the obligation and the remedy for enforc-
ing it. As noted by the Sturges Court:
The distinction between the obligation of a contract, and the remedy
given by the legislature to enforce that obligation, has been taken at the
bar, and exists in the nature of things. Without impairing the obligation
of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of
the nation shall direct.
20
Although the remedy-obligation analysis has changed somewhat in ap-
plication,2" the distinction continues to allow a state to enact legislation
that modifies the contractual remedy without necessitating its impair-
ment.
In the nation's first century,2 2 the contract clause was the most widely
used protection of individual property rights against state regulation.
Before 1889 the contract clause had been considered by the Court in
almost forty per cent of all cases involving the validity of state legislation.
So successfully was its protection invoked that it was the constitutional
justification for seventy-five decisions in which state laws were held un-
constitutional, almost half of all those in which such legislation was de-
clared invalid by the Supreme Court.23
The contract clause began to diminish in importance in the late nine-
teenth century, as the Court began to recognize a new theory, based on
the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth admendments, to
protect individual property rights from state regulation. This theory,
16. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
17. Id at 303.
18. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 429-30 (1934). United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19-20 n.17 (1977).
19. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
20. Id at 200. The remedy can be modified without impairing the obligation of contract
provided no substantial right secured by the contract is thereby impaired. See United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19-21 & n.17 (1977).
21. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. at 19-21 & n.17.
22. B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 95 (1938).
23. Id
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called substantive or economic due process, allowed the Court to ex-
amine the substance of legislation and the ends to which the legislation
was aimed and to determine independently if the legislation violated
the liberty and property protections afforded by those amendments.
24
The due process theories that developed provided greater flexibility
than the contract clause because their protections extended to the fed-
eral government as well as to state governments, they did not require
the existence of a contract, and did not only prohibit retrospective legis-
lation. This greater flexibility induced the Court to rely on the substan-
tive due process doctrine rather than on the contract clause.2 - These
two theories were really used to accomplish the same result and it was,
therefore, inevitable that the turn-of-the-century Court would use the
more flexible one. Under both theories the Court could decide that
legislation infringed on property rights, including those rights based on
contract. In the 1930's, the application of the doctrine of substantive
due process began to decline, as did the importance of the contract
clause. In analyzing legislation, the Court began to defer to the legisla-
tive judgment, determining that it was not the Court's function to de-
cide the need for and wisdom of legislation.26 The deference analysis
under both the contract clause and substantive due process theories was
generally parallel, up through 1977.27
B. Blaisdell Interpretation
A 1934 decision, Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdel,21 is
the forerunner of modem contract clause jurisprudence. Although
Blaisdell established a strict test by which legislation impairing the ob-
ligation of contract is to be evaluated, the theories expounded in the
Blaisdell decision have been used by subsequent courts as precedent
for lenient evaluation of state legislation that impairs contracts.
29
In Blaisdell, a Minnesota statute that established a moratorium on
the foreclosure of mortgages was challenged as violating the contract
24. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (while the challenged statute
here was enacted within the state police powers, there are limits to legislative action and the
judiciary determines if the limits have been surpassed); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897) (Court determines if and when state legislature surpasses its authority); Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Court determines that statute regulating baker's hours has no
legitimate purpose).
25. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNo, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 425 (1978). See
notes 123-128 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of substantive due process.
26. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
27. See notes 170-175 infra and accompanying text.
28. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
29. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
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clause. Specifically, the statute provided a judicial procedure by which
sales on foreclosed real estate could be postponed and periods of re-
demption extended. The legislation was to remain in effect only for the
duration of the declared emergency, the economic depression of the
1930's, or for a statutorily established time limit, whichever occurred
first.30
This foreclosure moratorium was upheld against a contract clause
challenge.3' In finding the legislation constitutional, the Court noted
that past application of the contract clause has "put it beyond question
that the prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be read with
literal exactness like a mathematical formula."32 The Court identified
as an impairment of contract the change in foreclosure provisions be-
cause it significantly altered the contract remedies. Although the Court
found this remedy impairment to be within the broad constitutional
concept of contract impairment, the legislation was upheld as a valid
exercise of the state police power.
33
In upholding the legislation, the Court established new standards by
which to evaluate the validity of legislation impairing the obligations of
contracts. The inquiry is not simply whether an obligation is impaired,
but rather "whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and
the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end." 34 This
flexible standard allows the Court to construe the contract clause
prohibitions in harmony with the state police power and to hold a stat-
ute valid as a legitimate exercise of the police power even if the statute
impairs contractual obligations.
The contract clause analysis that derives from Blaisdell parallels the
economic due process approach that derives from Webbla v. New
30. 290 U.S. at 415-19.
31. Id at 447-48.
32. Id at 428.
33. Id at 447-48. Blaisdell, significantly, is the first case in which the Court goes beyond
the explicit language of the contract clause to resolve a contract clause question. The theory,
however, that a contract impairment can be constitutionally justified as an exercise of the
state's reserved powers is older than Blaisdell. In Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905),
the Court said,
It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation
of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it
for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the
public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be
affected. This power, which in its various ramifications is known as the police power, is
an exercise of the sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives, health, morals,
comfort and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under con-
tracts between individuals.
Id at 480.
34. 290 U.S. at 438.
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York,3 5 a case decided the same year as Blaisdell. Both cases used an
ends-means analysis, and gave a certain degree of judicial deference to
the legislative determination of the legitimacy of the'end.36 The ends-
means analysis basically requires that the ends sought by the legislation
be legitimate and that the means used to attain that end be rational.
While an ends-means test is flexible and lends itself to a loose inter-
pretation, the Blaisdell Court removed this flexibility by adding a five-
factor test that must be satisfied before the legislation working the con-
tract impairment could be found valid.37 The legitimacy of the ends
and the reasonableness of the means were judged by the following five
factors: (1) an emergency must exist that furnishes a "proper occasion
for the exercise of the reserved power of the State to protect the vital
interests of the community;"38 (2) the legislation must be for the protec-
tion of a basic interest of society, not for the mere advantage of particu-
lar individuals; 39 (3) the relief must be appropriate to the character of
the emergency that existed;4 ° (4) the conditions of the legislation must
be reasonable;4' and (5) the legislation must be temporary and limited
to the exigency that called it forth.4 2
The Court found each of these five factors satisfied in Blaisdell.
First, the Court found that the required emergency existed to furnish
the occasion for the exercise of the state police powers. The Court took
judicial notice of the economic depression and the effects of the depres-
sion on the real estate market. Recognizing that without this legislation
there would be a loss of homes that furnish shelter and the means of
subsistence in the state, the Court decided that this first factor was satis-
fied. 43
Second, the Court found that the legislation was for the protection of
a basic interest of society, not merely for the advantage of particular
35. 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding price control on milk).
36. In Nebbia, the state of New York had established a regulatory board that had the
authority to set minimum prices for the retail sale of milk. The Court sustained the legisla-
tion as a legitimate exercise of the state's police power. The Nebbia Court stated that the
Court's function "is to determine in each case whether circumstances vindicate the chal-
lenged regulation as a reasonable exertion of governmental authority or condemn it as arbi-
trary or discriminatory." Id at 536. The decision contained language suggesting that the
Court's use of the substantive due process doctrine to invalidate economic or welfare legisla-
tion was at an end.
37. 290 U.S. at 444-48.
38. Id at 444.
39. Id at 445.
40. Id
41. Id at 445-47.
42. Id at 447-48.
43. Id at 444-45.
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individuals. While the Court did not elaborate on its findings in this
area, the legislation itself made it apparent that large masses of the
state's population would be affected. 4 Third, the Court noted that the
legislation was appropriate to the emergency. Because the legislation
was to remain in effect no longer than the existence of the emergency
and its use was limited, its character was appropriate to the emer-
gency.45 Fourth; the Court found that the conditions imposed by the
legislation were reasonable because the indebtedness continued to run
and the mortgagee was still bound by the loan contract.46 Factors three
and four above can be characterized as inquiries into the severity of the
impairment. Examining the severity is actually an analysis of the rea-
sonableness of the means used. Fifth, the legislation questioned was
temporary because it was to expire by a specified date or at the end of
the exigency, whichever occurred first.
47
C Modern Interpretation
The five-factor Blaisdell test was actually an extension of the sub-
stantive due process test existing at that time. The first factor of the test
examines the legitimacy of the legislative ends and enables courts to
determine independently if the legislative purpose is valid; the remain-
ing factors focus on the reasonableness of the means chosen to meet
that end.
Subsequent contract clause decisions have liberalized the Blaisdell
test and eliminated the five-factor analysis. The evolution began in
W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas,48 a case decided in the same term as
Blaisdell. In Thomas, the appellee Thomas and her husband became
indebted to appellant Worthen for the rent of premises leased to the
husband-wife partnership by Worthen. A judgment was entered on the
amount due but the husband died before this amount was paid.
Worthen then served a writ of garnishment against an insurance policy
that was issued on the husband's life, and of which Mrs. Thomas was
the beneficiary. 49
A few days after the writ of garnishment was issued, the Arkansas
legislature passed a statute prohibiting garnishment for a debt of cer-
tain insurance benefits, including life insurance. 50 When Worthen was
44. Id at 445.
45. Id
46. Id at 445-47.
47. Id at 447-48.
48. 292 U.S. 426 (1934).
49. Id at 429.
50. Id at 429-30.
I. '
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prohibited by the statute from exercising its garnishment rights, it chal-
lenged the statute as violative of the contract clause. The Court ex-
amined the statute and found that it did impair the contract between
Thomas and Worthen by exempting some future acquisitions, that is,
insurance benefits, from property available to settle contract debts.
5
1
However, merely isolating the existence of a contract impairment did
not end the contract clause analysis. The Thomas Court recognized
that Blaisdell requires that the contract clause limitations be construed
in harmony with the state's reserved power available "to protect the
vital interests of its people."52 This recognition brought the Court to an
ends-means analysis: Are the ends legitimate and the means reason-
able? The Court noted that Blaisdell allows for a statutory impairment
if the conditions requiring the impairment are brought about by an
emergency. However, the Thomas Court noted that, even assuming the
existence of an emergency that would legitimize the ends of this legisla-,
tion, the means used to achieve these ends were not reasonable. 3
"[T]he legislation was not limited to the emergency and set up no con-
ditions apposite to emergency relief."'54 In contrast, the statute vali-
dated in Blaisdell limited its relief to, at most, the existence of the
emergency creating the need for the legislation. Thus, the Thomas
Court found that the Arkansas statute satisfied neither the fifth factor
of the Blaisdell test (temporariness) nor the standard of "reasonable
means." 55 The statute was, therefore, held unconstitutional.
Thomas is significant in that it involves the classic contract clause
problem, a statute impairing a debtor-creditor relationship. It is neces-
sary to recall that the contract clause was adopted to prevent state inter-
ference with precisely these kinds of relationships. 6 In Thomas, the
Court used both the five-factor Blaisdell analysis (although it only had
to analyze the last factor to find the test was not fulfilled) and, more
significantly, the substantive due process ends-means analysis of Blais-
dell to determine that the legislation violated the contract clause.
In W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh,7 the Court grappled further
with the tests set down in Blaisdell and with their application to state
51. Id at 431-34.
52. Id at 432-33 (citing Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934)).
53. 292 U.S. at 433.
54. Id at 432.
55. Id. at 434. "In the instant case, the relief sought to be afforded is neither temporary
nor conditional. . . .We find the legislation, as here applied, to be a clear violation of the
constitutional restriction." Id
56. See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text.
57. 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
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legislation impairing contracts. Kavanaugh involved state legislation
that extended the period of foreclosure after assessment on municipal
bonds. The foreclosure extension left the bondholder without an effec-
tive remedy for at least six and one-half years and during that period
there was no enforceable obligation to pay installments of principal or
accruing coupons. The legislation was passed under a declaration of
emergency.5
The bondholders contested the validity of these statutory changes as
being in violation of the contract clause.5 9 The Kavanaugh Court
agreed that the statute unconstitutionally impaired a contractual obli-
gation. 0 The main basis for invalidating the legislation was the
Court's finding that the legislative means used to implement the
changes in the foreclosure provision were not reasonable. The Court
contrasted the six and one-half year period of foreclosure moratoriums
with the two-year period in Blaisdell. The Court also noted that, in
Blaisdell, the debtor was required to pay at least the rental value of the
property during the moratorium and that no similar provision was
made in the Kavanaugh statute.6
Significantly, the Kavanaugh decision did not mention the five-factor
test of Blaisdell. Rather, the Court analyzed the contract impairment
on the basis of an ends-means analysis. In utilizing this ends-means
analysis, the Kavanaugh Court's analysis paralleled the analysis that
was beginning to emerge in substantive due process litigation. Kava-
naugh was decided between Nebbia v. New York62 and West Coast Ho-
tel v. Parrish.63 In that period, the Court was coming to grips with a
theory that would require it to defer to the legislative evaluation of the
legitimacy of the ends of the legislation, instead of allowing the Court
to decide if those ends were legitimate. As a step toward that, the Kava-
naugh Court took a liberal view of the permissible scope of the legisla-
tive ends. The Kavanaugh Court accepted the state legislature's
declaration of an emergency and did not attempt to undertake an in-
dependent determination. ' Contrast this with the Court's actions in
58. Id at 57-59.
59. Id at 59.
60. "Not even changes of the remedy may be pressed so far as to cut down the security of
a mortgage without moderation or reason or in a spirit of oppression. Even when the public
welfare is invoked as an excuse, these bounds must be respected." Id at 60.
61. Id at 63. "With studied indifference to the interests of the mortgagee or to his appro-
priate protection [the legislature] has taken from the mortgage the quality of an acceptable
investment for a rational investor." Id at 60.
62. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
63. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
64. 295 U.S. at 60.
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Blaisdell, in which the Court outlined and examined the great depres-
sion, and concluded that the situation created the need for the legisla-
tion.65 The Blaisdell Court, while giving lip service to theories of
deference, engaged in a judicial analysis of the need for the legislation.
Treigle v. Acme HomesteadAssociation,66 a 1936 decision, continued
the evolutionary process of the legitimate ends-reasonable means test
set out in Blaisdell. In Treigle, the state enacted legislation that modi-
fied the withdrawal procedures for shareholders of domestic building
and loan associations. The modification was enacted after appellant, a
shareholder, filed the statutorily required withdrawal notice. Under
the new legislation, the appellant would have received less of his
money immediately.67 The shareholder sued the building and loan as-
sociation, alleging that the statute violated the contract clause. The
Court analyzed the challenged statute only under an ends-means anal-
ysis,6" without mention of the five-factor analysis of Blaisdell. The
Court continued using the more liberal view established by Kavanaugh
as to legitimate ends, although it held that this legislation unconstitu-
tionally violated the contract clause. The Court found there was no
connection between the stated aim of the statute and its actual effect.
69
Although the Court held that the statute was unconstitutional, its use
of the ends-means analysis began to parallel even more closely the sub-
stantive due process analysis. The Court continued to hold a more lib-
eral view as to the legitimacy of the legislative ends, but insisted upon a
close relationship between the ends and the means.
70
Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Association,7 a case decided in
1940, like Treigle, illustrated that despite lip service to Blaisdell's the-
ory, the Court had in fact abandoned the Blaisdell test. In Veix, the
legislature passed a statute changing the withdrawal procedures for
shareholders of building and loan associations. A shareholder chal-
lenged the change, contending that it violated the contract clause. The
Court upheld the statute against this challenge, holding that such a
change was within legislative power.72
65. 290 U.S. at 422-23, 444.
66. 297 U.S. 189 (1936).
67. Id at 191-95.
68. Id at 197. A proper exercise of the police power must be "for an end which is in fact
public and the means adopted must be reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that
end." Id
69. Id at 197-98.
70. See note 123 infra.
71. 310 U.S. 32 (1940).
72. Id at 39-41.
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The Court used the ends-means analysis in determining the validity
of the challenged statute. Although the legislation originated in the
emergency situation presented by the depression, the legislation was of
a permanent nature. This permanency, however, did not offend the
Court. When examining the legislation, the Court noted its perma-
nency and stated, "We are here considering a permanent piece of legis-
lation. So far as the contract clause is concerned, is this significant?
We think not.""3 Thus, while the Court may not have explicitly re-
jected the five-factor Blaisdell analysis, they overtly rejected the fifth
factor requiring temporariness.
Significant is the loose application of the ends-means test. As in both
Treigle and Kavanaugh, the Veix Court's contract clause analysis par-
alleled its substantive due process analysis. In keeping with the sub-
stantive due process ends-means test of West Coast Hotel v. Parrish74
and its progeny, the Court deferred to the legislative judgment of the
legitimacy of the ends and did not insist on a tight fit between .the ends
and the means. In fact, the Court did not examine with any depth the
ends and the means. Rather, much of the opinion was merely a justifi-
cation of the state's actions.
75
The 1965 case of City of El Paso v. Simmons76 was the last contract
clause case decided by the Supreme Court before 1977. The legislation
in El Paso changed a state law that allowed purchasers of state land
who defaulted on payments to redeem the land at any time unless
rights of third parties intervened. In 1941, the law was amended to
limit reinstatement rights to five years from the forfeiture date. The
land directly involved here was forfeited in 1947 (thus, the statute had
no retroactive effect) and the appellee tried to restore his title more
than five years after forfeiture. The appellee challenged the statute as
unconstitutionally violating the contract clause. The Court upheld the
statute, holding that it did not violate the contract clause.77
The purpose of the statute was to end land speculation. Under the
former statute, forfeiting purchasers would let their titles remain dor-
mant for years and then reinstate title if and when oil and gas were
found on the land. The long shadow cast by perpetual possibility of
73. Id at 39.
74. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See note 123 infra.
75. The Court decided additional contract clause cases between 1940 and 1965. See, e.g.,
East New York Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945); Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of
Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942). The only case through 1977 holding state action uncon-
stitutional as violating the contract clause was Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362 (1941).
76. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
77. Id at 516-17.
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reinstatement gave rise to much litigation between forfeiting purchasers
and the state. The legislation was designed to remedy this situation.78
The Court, in upholding the statute, continued to use a loose and
liberal ends-means analysis. In examining the legitimacy of the ends,
the Court paralleled the substantive due process policies of deference to
legislative judgment. Once within the area of the state reserved power,
the Court recognized that it "must respect the 'wide discretion on the
part of the legislature in determining what is and what is not neces-
sary.' ",79 Policies of deference, combined with the Court's acceptance
of a loose fit between the ends and the means, are not equal to the
Blaisdell test. In El Paso, the Court did not attempt to apply any part
of the five-factor Blaisdell test. Rather, it used a more liberal applica-
tion of the ends-means analysis.
The El Paso decision spurred speculation that the contract clause
prohibitions, in their current application, had little practical effect in
protecting property rights. Justice Black, dissenting in El Paso, ex-
pressed the belief that the clear guaranties of the contract clause had
been balanced away.80 Other commentators believed "the clause is of
negligible importance, and might as well be stricken from the Constitu-
tion."'" It was further voiced that "results [of litigation] might be the
same if the contract clause were dropped out of the Constitution, and
the challenged statutes all judged as reasonable or unreasonable depri-
vations of property" under the due process clause.
82
D. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey Interpretation
Contrary to the fears and beliefs of commentators,83 the post-Blais-
dell interpretation of the contract clause prohibitions did not dictate a
permanent impotence for the clause. United States Trust Co. v. New
78. Id at 512-13.
79. Id at 508-09 (quoting East New York Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232-33).
80. 379 U.S. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting) ("In this case I am compelled to dissent from the
Court's balancing away the plain guarantee of Art. I, § 10. .. ").
81. H. CHASE & C. DUCAT, CORWIN'S THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY
105 (1974 ed.).
82. Hale, supra note 7, at 890-91.
83. Constitutional law textbook writers, too, have been very skeptical of the present im-
portance of the contract clause and have treated it accordingly. See E. BARRETT, JR., CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 571 (5th ed. 1977) ("In view of the relative lack
of present importance of the contract clause, the coverage here will be limited."); G. GUN-
THER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 604 (9th ed. 1975) ("Yet the con-
tract clause deserves brief separate attention here.").
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Jersey84 indicates that the contract clause prohibitions are not without
practical effect if the state is a party to the impaired contract.85 United
States Trust involved a statutory covenant between bondholders of the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and the Port Authority
itself. This covenant, providing the security provisions for the bonds,
was repealed by the New Jersey and New York legislatures,8 6 resulting
in a total abrogation of this particular provision of the bonds. Bond-
holders challenged this repeal as an unconstitutional impairment of the
obligation of contract. The Court agreed with the bondholders and
found the statutory repeal to violate the contract clause. 87 Signifi-
cantly, the Court used a Blaisdell analysis. In this respect, the United
States Trust Court recognized that legislation can impair the obliga-
tions of contract and still be constitutional if that legislation satisfies the
legitimate ends-reasonable means test.8 Further, the Court continued
to recognize that it is a legislative function to determine the "necessity
and reasonableness of a particular measure."8 9 However, the Court re-
jected the concept of deference to the legislative determination of ne-
cessity and reasonableness in instances in which the state is a party to
the contract affected by the legislation: "When a State impairs the obli-
gation of its own contract, the reserved-powers doctrine has a different
basis."9 Thus, the Court resurrected the strict Blaisdell test in the lim-
ited context in which the state impairs a contract to which it is a party.
The strict United States Trust test is not absolute. A state may, under
certain circumstances, be able to pass legislation that impairs contracts
to which it is a party without violating the contract clause. An impair-
84. 431 U.S. 1 (1977). United States Trust is a 4-3 decision. Justice Stewart took no part
in the decision and Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
85. Id. at 32. See also McTamaney, United States Trust Company of New York v. New
Jersey. The Contract Clause in a Complex Society, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1977);
Kayajanian, United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey. The Resurrection ofthe Contract Clause,
5 W. ST. L. REV. 189 (1978); Comment, Revivalofthe Contract Clause, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 195
(1978).
86. 431 U.S. at 14. Although statutory repeal was passed by both New Jersey and New
York, suit was filed only against New Jersey.
87. Id at 32. The dissent questioned whether there was actually any impairment of con-
tract. It is noted by the dissent that the statute imposes only inconsequential burdens and
does not impair any practical or substantial rights. Id at 34 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Be-
cause there was no actual showing of any financial loss by the bondholders, the dissent may
well be correct. If there is no actual loss then no impairment should be found because the
Constitution is "intended to preserve practical and substantial rights, not to maintain theo-
ries." Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 514 (1942) (quoting
Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904)).
88. 431 U.S. at 22.
89. Id at 23.
90. Id
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ment of a state's own contractual obligations "may be constitutional if
[that impairment] is reasonable and necessary to serve an important
public purpose."' I The words "reasonable and necessary" are read dif-
ferently and more strictly in the instances in which a state legislative act
impairs its own contracts. "In applying this standard, however, com-
plete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and neces-
sity is not appropriate because the state's self-interest is at stake. A
governmental entity can always find a use for extra money."92 Thus,
the Court held that when a state modifies its own contract in its own
self-interest, it is a function of the judiciary to determine if the modifi-
cation satisfies the legitimate ends-reasonable means test. This is in
contrast to the almost absolute deference to the legislative determina-
tion of need exhibited in City of El Paso v. Simmons, which also in-
volved a state modification of a contract to which the state was a
party.93 The United States Trust Court's elaboration on their deference
test illustrates the similarity of its test both to Blaisdell and the substan-
tive due process analysis of that era.
The United States Trust test is this: When the state acts in its self-
interest in modifying the contract, the "necessary and reasonable" test
is given a strict application and is applied without deference to the leg-
islature. In these circumstances, "reasonable" is interpreted to mean
that the situation requiring the modification was unforeseeable.94
"Necessary" is satisfied only if there are no less drastic alternatives that
could implement the modification accomplished by the legislation.95
This Blaisdell-type test has already had significant impact in contract
clause challenges to state legislation that impairs state contracts.96
91. Id at 25 (emphasis added).
92. Id at 25-26.
93. See notes 76-79 supra and accompanying text.
94. 431 U.S. at 31-32.
95. Id at 29-31.
96. Fiscal problems are now prevalent in many municipalities and states. Whether these
situations will lead to the impairment of contracts in state financial self-interest is unknown.
If this does occur, however, the United States Trust analysis will have to be used to deter-
mine if these impairments are constitutional. For an excellent comment dealing with New
York City's fiscal crisis, written before the United States Trust decision, see Comment, The
Constitutionality of the New York Municpal Wage Freeze and Debt Moratorium: Resurrec-
tion of the Contract Clause, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 167 (1976).
Further effect of the United States Trust case could extend to situations such as those
presented by a recent (June 1978) California initiative (commonly known as the Jarvis-
Gann initiative), which limits the assessment and taxing powers of state and local govern-
ments. CAL. CONST. Art. XIIIA. If this initiative, by limiting state and local revenue, were
to cause the impairment of contract, the impairment would have to satisfy the United States
Trust analysis to be constitutional. For example, in Sonoma County Org. of Pub. Employ-
ees v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296, 591 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1979), the Califor-
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Significantly, United States Trust, by resurrecting the Blaisdell test in
a limited context, has become a harbinger for Blaisdell's across-the-
board resurrection. This resurrection became a fact in 1978, in the case
of Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,9 7 when the Court specifically
incorporated the Blaisdell factor analysis into its decision-making proc-
ess. Through Allied the strict Blaisdell test, with its refusal to defer to
the legislative judgment of need, became a fact for contract clause liti-
gation, while remaining a piece of history for litigation involving other
economic concerns not protected by the contract clause. As will be
shown, the Court continues in the traditional approach when the due
process clause is involved.
II. ALLIED STRUCTURAL STEEL: THE OPINION
Allied Structural Steel (the company) brought an action challenging
the constitutionality of the Minnesota Private Pension Benefits Protec-
tion Act (Pension Act) on the grounds that it violated the contract
clause.98 Although the company's principal place of business was in
Illinois, it maintained an office in Minnesota with thirty employees. In
1963 the company voluntarily adopted a pension plan, over which it
retained a complete right to terminate or modify. The company's con-
trol over the plan was complete except for those contributions already
made or rights already vested.99 Only the company contributed to the
plan, and those contributions were made yearly, based on actuarial pre-
dictions.
nia Supreme Court held that a state statute, which distributed bail-out funds to
municipalities on the condition that pay hikes and cost of living increases were not granted,
was unconstitutional as violating the contract clause of the Constitution. The Court noted
that United States Trust is the "most useful [decision] in resolving the problem at hand." Id
at 307, 591 P.2d at 6, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 908. Given the trend toward adopting this type of tax
restrictive legislation, it seems inevitable that more of these contract clause issues will arise.
When they do, the standards from United States Trust will control.
97. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
98. Id at 239-40. At the district court level the statute was challenged as violating the due
process, equal protection, and commerce clauses of the Constitution, as well as the contract
clause. Fleck v. Spannaus, 449 F. Supp. 644 (D. Minn. 1977). Only the contract clause
challenge was considered at the Supreme Court level.
99. Rights would vest under this pension plan if an employee aged 65 or more retired
without satisfying any length of service requirement (size of pension would reflect length of
service with the company). An employee could also receive a pension, payable at 65, if he
met one of the following requirements: (1) he had worked 15 years for the company and
reached the age of 60; (2) he was at least 55 years old and the sum of his age and his years of
service with the company was at least 75; or (3) he was under 55 but the sum of his age and
years of service with the company was at least 80. Once rights vested under the pension
plan, a termination of employment would not affect right to payment. 438 U.S. at 236-38.
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In 1974 Minnesota enacted the Pension Act,' which provided that
an employer with over 100 employees, at least one of whom worked in
Minnesota, who provided a pension plan satisfying section 401 of the
Internal Revenue Code,10 was subject to the Act. It provided that if
such an employer ceased doing business altogether or closed its Minne-
sota office, that employer would be subject to a pension fund charge.
This charge was assessed if the assets in the company's plan were not
sufficient to provide full pensions for employees who had worked ten
years or more.1
0 2
After the passage of the Pension Act, the company began closing its
Minnesota office. Because the company employed over 100 people and
met the other criteria of the Act, Minnesota imposed a pension funding
charge. Minnesota notified the company that it owed approximately
$185,000 under the terms of the Act.'0 3 Allied Structural Steel then
brought suit in federal district court 4" challenging the constitutionality
of the Act and seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief. The com-
pany alleged that the Pension Act unconstitutionally impaired the con-
tract between itself and its employees. The district court held the Act
valid, 10 5 relying almost exclusively on United States Trust1 6 to reach
its decision. The court noted that because the state was not a party to
the impaired contract, great deference had to be given to the legislative
judgment that the impairment was reasonable and necessary to accom-
plish legitimate policy aims. 107 With such great deference to the legis-
lative judgment, the district court could find no basis on which to hold
the Act unconstitutional. The company appealed the district court de-
cision, eventually to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed
and held that the Minnesota Pension Act unconstitutionally impaired
the obligation of contract.'08
In reversing, the Court noted that the Pension Act had a severe and
substantial impact on the contractual relationship beteeen the company
and its employees. The Court held that by superimposing pension obli-
gations beyond those the company had voluntarily agreed to under-
100. Minn. Stat. §§ 181B.01-181B.17.
101. The company's pension plan qualified under I.R.C. § 401 (1976). 438 U.S. at 236.
102. Id at 238.
103. Id at 239.
104. Fleck v. Spannaus, 449 F. Supp. 644 (D. Minn. 1977) (mem.). See also Fleck v.
Sparmaus, 421 F. Supp. 20 (D. Minn. 1976) (challenging the enforceability of the Pension
Act).
105. 449 F. Supp. at 654.
106. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
107. 449 F. Supp. at 649-51.
108. 438 U.S. at 250-5 1.
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take, the Pension Act substantially altered the company's contractual
expectations. The mere alteration of contract, however, did not neces-
sitate finding the statute unconstitutional. The contract clause is not an
absolute prohibition on the impairment of contract obligations. 0 9
Clause prohibitions must be construed in harmony with the reserved
power of the states, particularly exercises of the police power. The
Court recognized the existence and viability of both the contract clause
and the state police power and the conflict they presented in Allied, and
proceeded to determine which prevailed under these facts.
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stewart, began their
analysis by noting that the severity of the impairment determines the
strictness of the inquiry into the nature and purpose of state legislation.
In other words, the greater the impairment, the less deference to the
legislative judgment. The Court proceeded to find that the Pension Act
severely impaired the company's contract by retroactively increasing
the company's obligation to make pension plan contributions. Noting
that with pension plans the occurrence of major unforeseen contingen-
cies can affect a company's solvency,110 the Court found that this Pen-
sion Act severely disrupted the company's contractual expectations.
Because of the severeity of the contractual disruption and the legisla-
tive failure to demonstrate the need for this disruption, the Court held
that "[t]he presumption favoring 'legislative judgment as to the neces-
sity and reasonableness of a particular measure' . . . simply cannot
stand in this case."' I
In holding the Pension Act unconstitutional, the Court retreated
from the post-Blaisdell broad reading of what is in the public interest
and readopted the strict Blaisdell test of public interest. In doing so,
the Court considered three of the five Blaisdell factors 12 and analyzed
the challenged legislation in relation to them." 3 The Allied Court ad-
ded an additional factor from veix,"14 not present in Blaisdell. By se-
109. Id. at 241-42. See also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934),
City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
110. 438 U.S. at 247. The majority cites to Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Man-
hart, 435 U.S. 702, 721 (1978), to support the proposition that unforeseen contingencies in
pension plans can affect solvency. An excellent article on the effect of unforeseen termina-
tion of pension plans, the evil the Minnesota Legislature was attempting to eliminate, is
Bernstein, Employee Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down: Problems and Some Proposals,
76 HARV. L. REV. 952 (1963).
111. 438 U.S. at 247 (quoting United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23
(1977)).
112. See notes 37-47 supra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 143-45 infra and accompanying text.
114. See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
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lecting four factors that had to be satisfied before the impairment could
be held constitutional, the Allied Court set up a strict, and in this case,
insurmountable test. Therefore, the finding of unconstitutionality was
inevitable.' 15
III. ALLIED STRUCTURAL STEEL: DEVIATIONS AND IMPACT
Allied deviates from modem contract clause theory and analysis in
three major areas. First, the Allied Court strictly applies the ends-
means analysis by accepting only a narrow area of permissible ends, in
contrast to recent precedent;'16 second, the Court refuses to maintain
the presumption favoring the legislative judgment as to the necessity
and reasonableness of the legislation; I 7 and, third, the Court expands
the concept of what the term contract encompasses for purposes of ana-
lyzing contract impairment."l 8 The impact of these deviations will be
significant. The Court's analysis completes the resurrection of Blaisdell
started by United States Trust and implicitly overrules the modem con-
tract clause interpretation that evolved after the Blaisdell case.
A. Strict Application of Ends-Means Analysis-Narrow Scope for
Permissible Ends
Since the 1890's, the Court has consistently applied both an ends-
means test"l 9 and a test of permissible ends to challenged legislation
under both the due process and contract clauses.' u0 Since that time, the
formulation of the test has remained the same, but its application has
varied. The Court has consistently held that the end (purpose) of legis-
lation must be within a legitimate area of governmental concern. The
differences in application have resulted from the Court's view of what
constitutes a legitimate end and the degree of deference the Court af-
fords to the legislative determination of whether an end is permissi-
ble.'' The ends-means analysis is closely related to the permissible
115. "But we do hold that if the Contract Clause means anything at all, it means that
Minnesota could not constitutionally do what it tried to do to the company in this case." 438
U.S. at 250-51.
116. Id at 248-49. See text accompanying notes 119-67 infra.
117. 438 U.S. at 247-48. See text accompanying notes 168-86 infra.
118. 438 U.S. at 244-47 & n.16. See text accompanying notes 187-222 infra.
119. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
120. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 436-42 (1978).
121. Compare Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) with West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). In Adkins, the Supreme Court held that a minimum wage
law assigned to protect women laborers was unconstitutional because the end of the legisla-
tion fell outside of the permissible range of legislative control. 261 U.S. at 554. In West
Coast Hotel, however, similar legislation was upheld on the rationale that the protection of
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ends analysis. The ends-means analysis requires not only that the leg-
islation be aimed at a permissible end of government, but also that the
means used to meet that end be reasonable. The application of this test
has varied.12 2 At times the Court has insisted on a close relation be-
tween the ends and the means, while at other times, the Court has de-
ferred to the legislative judgment of what is a reasonable means to
achieve the ends.
During the substantive due process era 123 of 1880-1935 the Court
insisted on a close relation between the ends and the means of the legis-
lation, and strictly construed the legitimate ends of government. 124 An
example of the Court's analysis during that period is Lochner v. New
women is a legitimate legislative end. 300 U.S. at 398. These disparate conclusions are
primarily the result of a shift in the Court's perception of what constitutes a legitimate legis-
lative end.
122. Compare Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) with Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
123. Substantive due process was a theory utilized by the Court, between Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), to void
any economic or social legislation that the court believed unreasonably infringed on the
liberty to contract. The substantive due process test required that the government use
means, the legislation, that bore some reasonable relation to a legitimate end. While the test
is substantially the same today, during the substantive due process era, the Justices voided
any law that did not satisfy their personal belief as to what was necessary. Thus, independ-
ent judicial review of legislation made the constitutionality of the legislation depend on the
personal views of individual Justices. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
(regulation of bakers' hours held to violate due process); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251 (1918) (child labor law held unconstitutional); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S.
525 (1923) (minimum wage law held unconstitutional).
It seems that the only way social or economic legislation could be validated during this
period was to present the court with a "Brandeis Brief," a brief containing massive docu-
mentation to justify the legislation. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 n. 1 (1908).
The substantive due process doctrine died in the 1930's, and was replaced with the doc-
trine that called for the Court to defer to the legislative judgment as to the necessity and
reasonableness of the legislation. See, e.g., Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941)
("We are not concerned, however, with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legisla-
tion. Differences of opinion on that score suggest a choice which 'should be left where. . . it
was left by the Constitution-to the states and to Congress.' ") (citations omitted); Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) ("Our recent decisions make plain that
we do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to decide whether
the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare."). See generally Strong, The Eco-
nomic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 15 ARIz. L. REV.
419 (1973).
The rationales that led to deferring to the legislative judgment in the substantive due
process area also led to a policy of deference when the contract clause was involved. See,
e.g., East New York Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 233 (1945) ("[W]e must respect the
'wide discretion on the part of the legislature in determining what is and what is not neces-
sary.' ") (citations omitted).
124. See generally Strong, The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergence, Embrasure
and Emasculation, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 419 (1973).
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York. "'25 The legislation challenged in Lochner prohibited bakers from
working more than sixty hours a week. The Court held that the statute
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court found that the statute was not designed to achieve a permissible
end of government, in that it infringed on the liberty to contract en-
compassed in the due process clause. Further, the Court held that there
was no connection between the end sought-clean and healthful
bread-and the means used to achieve those ends-limiting baker's
hours. 1
26
In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,27 the Court rejected the substantive
due process analysis of Lochner, which required a close fit between the
ends and the means and close scrutiny of the ends of the legislation.
During the period between West Coast Hotel and Allied, in both the
contract and due process clause analyses, the Court deferred to the leg-
islative determination of the legitimacy of the ends, and utilized a loose
ends-means analysis. This application of the test has resulted in the
Court upholding legislation that would have been declared invalid dur-
ing the substantive due process era.'
28
The above discussion directly relates to the Allied Court's analysis.
Allied, therefore, represents a readoption of the strict tests used during
the substantive due process era. This return to the substantive due
process tests is manifested in two ways: (1) the Court strictly limits the
permissible range of legislative ends when the legislation impairs con-
tracts; and (2) the Court requires a very close fit between the ends of the
legislation and the means used to achieve those ends.
1. Strictly limiting the permissible ends of legislation
Allied implicitly limited the permissible ends of legislation by requir-
ing that the challenged legislation "deal with a broad, generalized eco-
nomic or social problem."' 29 It is, of course, the Court that will decide
whether the end of the legislation satisfies the broad societal interest
criterion. The Court recognized that contracts are subject to the valid
exercise of police power, but proceeded to state that the contract clause
does "impose some limits upon the power of a State to abridge existing
contractual relationships."3 ° The requirement that the legislation deal
125. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
126. Id at 56-57.
127. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
128. See note 121 supra.
129. 438 U.S. 250.
130. Id at 242 (emphasis in original).
1979]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
with a broad societal interest therefore limits a state's police power to
interfere with contractual relations.
The Court began its analysis by suggesting that the Minnesota Pen-
sion Act was invalid because the Act did not address all aspects of the
problem.' 3' This suggested invalidity results from the Pension Act's
failure to protect a broad societal interest. However, the Court's analy-
sis of this factor contains two misconceptions. First, it is well estab-
lished that a state, in acting for the general welfare, need not address
the entire problem. In rectifying a problem "the legislature is not
bound to occupy the whole field. It may strike at the evil where it is
most felt."' 32 The Minnesota legislature, in adopting the Pension Act,
was simply alleviating the problem where it was most felt. There are
indications 33 that the Minnesota legislature was aware that at least
one 34 corporation with employees in Minnesota was contemplating
terminating its Minnesota employees and closing its operation within
the state. The state, aware of this potential termination of operations,
enacted the Pension Act to ensure that employees similarly situated
would receive their expected pension benefits. 35 Thus, it is clear that
the legislature initially perceived the problem in a certain area and
sought to rectify it there first.
The second misconception in the Court's analysis is its interpretation
of the "broad societal interest" requirement, a concept derived from
Blaisdell. 36 The Allied Court stated that when an exercise of a state's
police power impairs the obligation of a contract, such exercise should
"protect a broad societal interest rather than a narrow class."'137 In us-
ing this language, the Allied Court interpreted the societal interest fac-
131. Id at 250. The statute's "narrow aim was levelled not at every Minnesota employer,
not even at every Minnesota employer who left the State, but only at those who had in the
past been sufficiently enlightened as voluntarily to agree to establish pension plans for their
employees." Id
132. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 519-20 (1937). The majority
opinion in Allied recognizes that the legislature first felt this problem when an employer in
the state terminated some of its operations within the state. 438 U.S. at 247-48 (quoting
Fleck v. Spannaus, 449 F. Supp. 644, 651 (D. Minn. 1977) (mem.)).
133. Fleck v. Spannaus, 449 F. Supp. 644, 651 (D. Minn. 1977) (mem.) ("It seems clear
that the problem of plant closure and pension plan termination was brought to the attention
of the Minnesota legislature when the Minneapolis-Moline Division of White Motor Corpo-
ration closed one of its Minnesota Plants and attempted to terminate its pension plan.").
134. Id For the results of the litigation as to the applicability of the Pension Act to White
Motor Corporation, see Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
135. 449 F. Supp. at 651. "There is absolutely no evidence from the legislative history or
debates on the Pension Act to support Allied's claim that the Act was aimed solely at White
Motor Corporation." Id
136. 290 U.S. 398, 445 (1934).
137. 438 U.S. at 249.
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tor to require that a large percentage of society must be directly
benefited by the legislation. Thus, the Allied Court interpreted this fac-
tor to require that a specific number of individuals be benefited. But
what Blaisdell actually required was that the legislation be "not for the
mere advantage of particular individuals but for the protection of a
basic interest of society."' 13 8 There is more than a semantic difference
between the Allied and the Blaisdell analyses of the societal interest
factor. Blaisdell was not concerned with the numbers directly benefited
by the challenged legislation. Rather, the test in Blaisdell was whether
the statute was designed to benefit the general welfare. That not all of
society was benefited directly by the statute attacked in Blaisdell is ap-
parent from its scope; it afforded protection only to individuals who
owned real property that was subject to foreclosure. 139 But the statute
was interpreted as effecting a broad societal benefit by allowing indi-
viduals to retain their real property, even though not all of society was
directly aided.
The statute held unconstitutional in Allied could be construed to
benefit a broad societal interest, even though the direct benefits of the
statute accrued to only a narrow class. 140 Pension plans provide eco-
nomic benefits to those who reach a certain age. The societal interest in
aiding the financial stability of the elderly is undeniable. Financial sta-
bility enables the elderly to spend money, thus economically benefiting
the surrounding community. Further, if the elderly are provided for in
pension plans, neither public nor private welfare agencies will have the
burden of ensuring the economic well-being of these individuals. Thus,
while the statute might numerically provide for only a "narrow class,"
it does satisfy the Blaisdell requirement of protecting a basic societal
interest, rather than particular individuals. Allied's insistence that a
statute benefit a certain number of people before it can be held to be a
legitimate exercise of the police power, distorts the Blaisdell require-
ment, and makes it extremely difficult for a statute to satisfy the Allied
societal interest criterion. Legislation is often enacted for the immedi-
ate benefit of a narrow class, with the ultimate benefits trickling down
to the broad base of society. By adopting this narrow view of legiti-
mate police power exercises, the Court is subjecting much of this legis-
lation to eventual contract clause challenges.
Further, the Court's insistence that a broad societal interest be served
by the legislation is a reversion to the theories predominate in Loch-
138. 290 U.S. at 445.
139. Id at 416-20.
140. See Fleck v. Spannaus, 449 F. Supp. 644, 649-50 & n.6 (D. Minn. 1977) (mer.).
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ner14 1 and to the substantive due process era limitation on legitimate
ends. In that era the Court insisted that legislation directly benefit the
public as a whole. The Court rejected this notion in West Coast Hotel,
when it realized that laws helping certain narrow groups help the pub-
lic as a whole as well.'
42
2. Strict application of ends-means analysis
In addition to resurrecting the Lochner restriction on legitimate ends,
Allied resurrected the Lochner strict scrutiny of the ends-means analy-
sis, which requires a close fit between the ends and the means. In ana-
lyzing the relation between the ends and the means, the Allied Court
adopted factors from earlier contract clause cases. Three factors, devel-
oped in earlier cases, were used to examine the reasonableness of the
means used to implement the legislative purpose: (1) whether the legis-
lation deals with an emergency situation, as in Blaisdell 43 (2) whether
the legislation is temporary in operation, as in Blaisdell;'" and (3)
whether the legislation operates in an area already subject to regula-
tion, as in Veix.' 45 While these factors were important and, perhaps
even determinative, in the cases from which they originate, the Court
has never before suggested that any or all of these factors must be satis-
fied to justify the exercise of the state reserved powers. Allied, however,
imposed upon the state the duty of satisfying these factors before the
statute could be found to be a justified exercise of state reserved power.
The Court subjected the Pension Act to a rigorous analysis in order to
determine if the Act fulfilled each of these factors. 46 In conducting
this analysis and applying these extracted factors, the Court distorted
their meaning.
The Allied Court found the Pension Act lacking because the legisla-
tion was not enacted to deal with an emergency situation.147 While
recognizing that it may not require "an emergency of great magnitude
constitutionally [to] justify a state law impairing the obligations of con-
tracts,"148 the Court did intimate that since no emergency situation jus-
141. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
142. 300 U.S. 379, 385 (1937).
143. 290 U.S. at 444-45.
144. Id at 447.
145. 310 U.S. at 38.
146. 438 U.S. 248-50. Whereas the Court tested the Pension Act by these factors, it recog-
nized that not all of them had been required in past cases that sustained contract clause
challenges. Id at 249 n.24.
147. Id at 249.
148. Id at 249 n.24.
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tified this statute, it did not have a permissible end and was therefore
unconstitutional. However, Veix 149 expressly holds that an emergency
situation need not exist for a statute to constitutionally impair the obli-
gation of the contract.' 50 For an exercise of the state power to act in the
general welfare to impair contractual obligations validly, there need
exist only a problem that is within the area of legislative competency.151
The Court further criticized the Pension Act because the Act pro-
vides relief that is permanent, 152 rather than the temporary relief af-
forded by the Blaisdell statute. However, statutes that have been held
constitutional when subject to a contract clause challenge have often
provided relief that is permanent. 53 A statute enacted to deal with a
situation that could not be characterized as an "emergency," may need
to provide permanent relief to be effective. Thus, by requiring relief to
be temporary, the Court is implicitly requiring an emergency, and vice
versa. Neither of these requirements finds support, however, in past
precedent. Rather, the Court in the past has validated statutes involv-
ing permanent relief in a non-emergency situation, even though they
impaired contract obligations.-
4
Further, the Pension Act can be viewed as providing only temporary
relief. The Act, by its terms was to remain in effect only until the fed-
eral Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was effective.
ERISA was to preempt all state laws, and the Minnesota legislature
indicated an awareness of ERISA's preemptive effect in the Pension
Act.'5 5 Thus, as the Court recognized, the Pension Act was in effect for
less than nine months. The Court, then, condemned the Pension Act
for not being temporary, while recognizing in a footnote that the Act's
effective life was less than nine months.'
56
Finally, the Court condemned the Pension Act because it did not
operate in an area already subject to regulation. 7 This requirement
149. 310 U.S. at 38-39. "If the legislature could enact the legislation. . - in that emer-
gency, we see no reason why the new status should not continue." Id at 39.
150. There are other cases in which legislation has been held valid despite its interference
with contracts and the situation in which they operated could not be characterized as "emer-
gency." See, e.g., East New York Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945); City of El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 479 (1965).
151. 379 U.S. 479.
152. 438 U.S. at 250.
153. See, e.g., Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940); City of El Paso
v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 479 (1965).
154. See note 153 supra.
155. 438 U.S. at 248-49 n.21.
156. Id ("[T]he Minnesota Act was in effect less than nine months").
157. 438 U.S. at 250.
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was derived from Veix,' 5 8 in which a statute altered the withdrawal
procedures for building and loan 'associations. While the fact that the
area in which the statute operated may have been significant in Veix, it
has never before been suggested that legislation, to impair a contractual
obligation justifiably, must operate in an area already subject to regula-
tion. '
59
The selective extraction and subsequent misapplication of factors rel-
evant in previous cases by the Court in Allied, operated as a misappli-
cation of past precedent. There is no indication that any of the
extracted factors was meant to be determinative, or even necessarily
significant in cases following Blaisdell. In actuality, each of these ex-
tracted factors was absent in at least one case in which a statute was
upheld against a contract clause challenge. Never in the post-Blaisdell
era were contract clause questions measured by such precise criteria,
satisfaction of each being a prerequisite for constitutionality. Prior to
Allied, challenged legislation was required to satisfy the legitimate
ends-reasonable means test and was considered in the totality of the
circumstances 160 rather than merely being required to satisfy specific
criteria.
These factors illustrate the Allied Court's reversion to the strict scru-
tiny test of the Lochner era. By applying this level of scrutiny in a
selected area--contracts impaired by state legislation-the Court has
singled out a particular type of interest, contract, and afforded it higher
protection than other interests. For example, the Court consistently
recognized the government's rights to interfere with property under po-
lice power, when a contract clause issue is not involved. In a case de-
cided the same term as Allied Structural Steel, Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York, 16 1 the Court upheld against a four-
teenth amendment due process challenge a city ordinance that re-
stricted the use of property, thereby lessening the value of appellant's
property. The Penn Central Court upheld this ordinance under both a
loose ends-means analysis, and a broad view of permissible ends. 162 A
158. 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940).
159. The Court has never before suggested that this is a significant factor. However, the
Court has overlooked the fact that labor relations, and employement contracts, are subject to
massive regulation. See generally LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS (2d ed. R.
Covington 1974).
160. See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977); City of El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 479 (1965).
161. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
162. Id at 136-38.
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similar example is Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining.163 In Turner Elk-
horn Mining the Court upheld against a fifth amendment due process
challenge a federal statute that retroactively affected the obligations of
mine owners to compensate former and present miners who contract
pneumoconiosis (black lung disease). The statute required employers
to pay compensation to these workers, although no such compensation
was required by the employee-employer contract."6 Despite the dras-
tic increase in financial liability and the retroactive and permanent ef-
fect of this legislation, it was held valid.
165
The real difference between Penn Central and Turner Elkhorn Min-
ing on the one hand, and Allied on the other is the way the Court ap-
plied the ends-means and legitimate ends test. In the first two cases the
Court was able to uphold the legislation, because it was willing to defer
to the legislative determination of what was in the public interest and
necessary and therefore a permissible end. 166 In Allied, however, the
legislation was declared invalid because of the strictness in applying the
tests. This results in an elevation of a particular interest, that protected
by contract, to a higher standard of protection than is afforded to non-
contractual interests. There is simply no rational basis for this distinc-
tion. Following the Allied theories, an identical statute could be passed
by both a state and the Congress, and the congressional statute upheld
because the contract clause only applies to states, 167 while the state stat-
ute is invalidated. Further, the mere finding of the existence of a con-
tract could affect the entire outcome of legislation.
B. Refusal To Maintain the Presumption Favoring the Legislative
Judgment as to Necessary and Reasonableness of Legislation
Although the Allied Court implicitly acknowledged the existence of a
presumption favoring the legislative judgment as to the need for legis-
lation and the reasonableness of the scheme adopted, the Court, for
reasons unexpressed, refused to maintain this presumption. 68 In doing
so, under the Allied facts, the Court initially noted that the Minnesota
163. 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
164. Id at 7-12.
165. Id at 38.
166. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Usery v. Turner Elk-
horn Mining, 428 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1976).
167. "No state shall .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
168. Yet there is no showing in the record before us that this severe disruption of con-
tractual expectations was necessary to meet an important general social problem. The
presumption favoring "legislative judgment as to te necessity and reasonableness of a
particular measure," . . . simply cannot stand in this case.
438 U.S. at 247 (citations omitted).
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Pension Act severely disrupted the contractual relationship between the
company and its employees. Because the state did not demonstrate any
need for the Pension Act, the Court determined that the presumption
favoring the legislative judgment could not stand.' 69 Thus, the Court
implied that the legislature has a duty to make some showing of the
need for the legislation before the presumption in its favor will be
maintained. In effect, therefore, there is no presumption, because the
burden is on the state, not on the party challenging the legislation.
This is, however, contrary to the current jurisprudential theories of
economic legislation. Since the 1930's, the challenger of the legislation
has had the burden of demonstrating that the legislation is unnecessary
or arbitrary. 7 0 The legislature has not been required to show the need
for the enactment. Rather, "the existence of facts supporting the legis-
lative judgment [was] to be presumed."''
Standard procedure since Blaisdell has been to defer to legislative
judgment'72 whether the challenge is under the due process or contract
clauses. Deference, a theory deriving from separation of powers and
concepts of federalism, has left as a legislative function the determina-
tion of which laws are needed, because the legislature is the body with
the duty of enacting legislation. "[The Court] does not sit as a super-
legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that
touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions." 173 Al-
though precedent establishes deference as the accepted practice, for
unarticulated reasons the Allied Court failed to follow these precedents.
If Allied indicates an intent by the Court to continue to refuse to main-
tain the presumption favoring legislative judgment, an arbitrary situa-
tion could result. For example, the Court would have to adjudicate
169. Id at 247-48. The Court notes that the only indication of legislative intent is found
in the district court opinion.
170. "Once we are in this domain of the reserve power of a state we must respect the 'wide
discretion on the part of the legislature in determining what is and what is not necessary'."
East New York Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 233 (1945) (citations omitted). The prac-
tice of giving deference to the legislature, and putting the burden on the challenger of the
legislation, is also illustrated in due process cases. See, e.g., Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S.
236, 246 (1941) ("There is no necessity for the state to demonstrate before us that evils
persist."); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) ("We conclude that the [state] Legis-
lature was free to decide for itself that legislation was needed to deal with the [problem].").
171. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
172. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508-09 (1965); East New York
Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232-33 (1945); United States Trust Co. v. New York, 431
U.S. 1, 22-23 (1977).
173. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,482 (1965). See also Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726, 732 (1963) ("The. . .statute may be wise or unwise. But relief, if any be needed,
lies not with us but with the body constituted to pass laws. .... ).
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questions involving economic legislation by different standards, de-
pending upon which constitutional clause the litigant relied. If a due
process violation were alleged, it would be the burden of the one chal-
lenging the legislation to come forward and demonstrate why the stat-
ute is not a legitimate exercise of the legislature's power.'74 If,
however, the contract clause was invoked, the state would have the bur-
den of demonstrating the legitimacy of the legislation, that it was both
necessary and reasonable. The result is greater protection for property
rights grounded in contract than for other property rights.'
75
Thus, if it is the intent of the Court to continue to refuse to maintain
the presumption favoring the legislative judgment, either property
grounded in contract would become a favored form of property when
positioned in a way that is subject to the contract clause, or, in an at-
tempt to be even handed, the Court could refuse to defer to the legisla-
tive judgment in all actions involving economic legislation. The latter
possibility, with the Court refusing to entertain legislative presumption
in any attack on economic legislation, would in reality be a return to
the principles and theories of the substantive due process era.' 76 Hope-
fully, the problems caused by the theories used by the Court during the
substantive due process era 17 7 are fresh enough in the Court's memory
that the presumption favoring the legislative judgment will not be dis-
carded in all economic legislation litigation. Recent authority indicates
that the Court will retain the practice of deference, at least when the
contract clause is not involved.'
78
A comparison of Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. 17 and Allied
174. Both state and federal legislation can be challenged on due process grounds, using
the fourteenth amendment if it is state legislation, the fifth if it is federal. Due process
theories now demand that the challenger of the legislation come forward and demonstrate
that the statute is arbitrary or capricious. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502
(1934); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726 (1963).
175. Compare the treatment of property in Allied, in which a contract was involved, with
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), and Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), neither of which involved contractual property. In
both of the latter cases, the presumption favoring the legislative judgment was upheld, and
the statute was found not to unconstitutionally deprive the challenger of property.
176. Substantive due process allowed the court to examine the substance of the legisla-
tion, and use their independent judgment to determine if the legislation was reasonable. See
note 123 supra.
177. The decisions of the court during the latter part of the substantive due process era
resulted in the invalidation of much of the "New Deal" legislation, and eventually led Presi-
dent Roosevelt to introduce his "court-packing" plan. See Strong, The Economic Philosophy
of Lochner Emergence, Embrasure and Emasculation, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 419, 449-54 (1973).
178. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
179. Id
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indicates the favored position that the Allied decision gives to property
based on contract when a state statute impairs the contract. The statute
challenged in Turner Elkhorn severely altered the obligations mine
owners had to employees. The old obligation was based on contract,
but the contract clause could not be invoked to give the mine owners
protection because the statute was federal and the contract clause only
prohibits state action. In Turner Elkhorn, decided in 1976, a Court
with the same composition as the Allied Court retained the presump-
tion favoring the legislative judgment against a substantive due process
challenge to the federal statute. In upholding the presumption favoring
the legislative judgment, the Turner Elkhorn Mining Court noted:
It is by now well established that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens
and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of
constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due
process violation to establish that the legislature acted in an arbitrary and
irrational way.'
80
The Allied Court, without even a modicum of logic evidenced, has
elevated property rights with contractual origins to a more protected
status than other property rights. An independent examination has in-
dicated no basis for the higher protection of these rights. The only via-
ble explanation for giving property that derives from contract greater
protection than other property is the explicit and absolute nature of the
contract clause. The contract clause provides that "no state shall,'' 81
absolutely prohibiting action, whereas the due process clause only pro-
hibits action that is not accompanied with due process. This analysis
breaks down, however, with the realization that the contract clause was
never considered absolute, and always thought to be subject to the po-
lice power.'1
2
Further, there does not appear to be any logic in a position that
would justify treating property differently based on its derivation,
180. Id
181. The contract clause explicitly provides that "[njo state shall ... pass any ... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONsT. Art. I § 10, cl. 1. Other clauses relied
on for the protection of individual property are not as explicit. An example is the due proc-
ess clause, which is the major clause relied on for the protection of property. The due proc-
ess clause of the fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall ... be deprived of...
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In the fourteenth amend-
ment the due process clause provides that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of...
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The more explicit nature
of the contract clause and the lack of any qualifiers such as "due process of law" in the
clause, can allow for it to be construed as providing greater protection for property than
other constitutional protections.
182. See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, I01 U.S. 814 (1880) (state can exercise its police pow-
ers regardless of contract).
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rather than its substance. If this different treatment continued, it would
be due to the happenstance that the Framers inserted the contract
clause to guard against a particular practice that existed under the Arti-
cles of Confederation,18 3 rather than on a recognition that some prop-
erty interests are more fundamental than others and thus require
greater protection.
A different treatment of property interests based solely on the form
which they take raises equal protection questions. For example, if
State X enacted a minimum wage law, this would be clearly proper
under the due process clause. However, under the new contract clause
test the minimum wage law might be unconstitutional as applied to
some employees. If one employer had workers under contract for less
than the minimum wage, the minimum wage law would have to un-
dergo strict scrutiny as applied to those employees. However, for non-
contract workers, the minimum wage law would only have to undergo
minimal scrutiny. The employer with the contract would be more
likely to avoid the minimum wage law, thus raising equal protection
questions. Thus, an employer could "contract" into immunity from
state police power legislation. Therefore, under the Allied theory, simi-
larly situated individuals will be treated differently, because of the
mere fortuity of a contract.
The Allied Court's refusal to defer to the legislative judgment does
not appear to be confined to the facts of that case. The only indication
that Allied's strict scrutiny analysis might be confined to that case is
that the Court indicated that Allied involved a severe impairment of
contract with no legislative showing of need.184 Thus, one might hope
that the Court would only refuse to engage in the traditional deference
if a severe impairment was combined with no legislative justifications.
This, however, is probably no more than a hope. The Allied Court
readily abandoned the deference tradition, which in the past required
no legislative justifications, and required the legislature to come for-
ward with justifications. There is no indication that the legislature
would not have the same burden if the finding of impairment was less
than severe. Further, the Court has, by using the words "severe disrup-
tion of contractual expectations"185 adopted a vague standard into law,
one which is so amorphous that it allows the Court to determine inde-
pendently, without standards, what is severe. Barring some further
183. See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text.
184. 438 U.S. at 249. "This legislation. . . [imposed] a sudden, totally unanticipated, and
substantial retroactive obligation upon the company . Id
185. Id at 247.
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elaboration on the Allied standard, one would have to conclude that
this refusal to defer has become an integral part of contract clause liti-
gation.
C Court Expands the Concept of What Is Included in a Contractfor
the Purpose of Analyzing a Contract Impairment
Allied, together with United States Trust, formally changes the na-
ture of the inquiry aimed at determining if there has, in fact, been an
impairment of contract.1 6  Traditionally the question asked was
whether there had been either a modification or abrogation of the obli-
gations of the contract or a severe disruption of the remedy that, by
making the enforcement of the obligation unduly difficult, rendered the
obligation worthless.187  United States Trust indicated that the aim of
this inquiry was misplaced. 88 The recognition that obligations as well
as remedies can be modified without violating the contract clause has
made the traditional inquiry "largely an outdated formalism."' 89 Al-
lied and United States Trust, changed the nature of the initial inquiry,
directing that inquiry to the question of what the legitimate expecta-
tions of the contracting parties were. By concentrating on the vague
notion of contractual expectations the Court has created a means to
expand the application of the contract clause. The Court has inter-
preted this legitimate expectations test to mean two different things. Al-
lied is a vehicle for an expansive application of the contract clause,
whereas in United States Trust the Court follows a more traditional
contract clause approach.
The statute challenged in Allied does not dilute or abrogate any obli-
gation owed by one party to another under a private contract. 90 What
186. The first inqiury in any case arising under the contract clause is whether a contract is
actually involved. The inquiry then proceeds to determine whether the challenged statute
operates in a way that impairs the obligation of the contract. See, e.g., Treigle v. Acme
Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1936). Only after an impairment is isolated does
the Court proceed to determine if that impairment is constitutional. City of El Paso v. Sim-
mons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
187. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 430-31 (1934).
188. 431 U.S. at 19-21 n.17 & 26-27 n.25.
189. Id at 19-21 n.17.
190. It is questionable whether Allied even presented a contract clause issue. To come
under the contract clause there must be a statute that impairs a contract. See United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19-21 n.17. What, then, is the contract involved in
Allied? The Court indicates that the contract at issue was the employer-employee contract
that required the company to pay money to its employees for work done, and the part of the
contract at issue is the pension plan. Can this be characterized as a contract? Contract is
often defined as "a promise, or set of promises, for breach of which the law gives a remedy,
or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." I S. WILLISTON,
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the Allied Court identifies as impaired by the Pension Act would not
even traditionally be defined as a term of a contract. 9 ' The challenged
statute actually impairs the contractually based expectations of the par-
ties. Although in isolation, the distinction between impairing a term
and impairing an expectation of contract may sound like a semantic
game, in application, this distinction expands the reach of the contract
clause prohibitions. In Allied, the contract impaired was an employ-
ment contract between the company and its employees. A generous
interpretation of this contract would allow it to be construed to include
the company's pension plan, as well as other fringe benefits of employ-
ment. So interpreted, the contract required the company to pay X
amount of dollars to each employee for salary and fringe benefits. The
Minnesota Pension Act did not prevent the company from paying X
amount, nor did it prevent any employee from fulfilling his obligations
assumed in the contract. In reality, the Pension Act allowed the parties
to perform upon their agreed duties. What the statute did, which the
Court interpreted as an impairment, was to alter the expectations of the
parties that were based on the contract. Thus, the statute required the
company to pay the agreed upon amount, X, to the employee for salary
and fringe benefits, and added a new obligation to the company, to pay
an extra amount, Y.192 Because the statute required the company to do
CONTRACTS § 1 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1957). Can the pension plan be termed a contract, or even
a basis for contractual expectations? The pension plan instituted by the company was vol-
untarily established. The company retained a complete right to terminate or modify the
plan at any time, excepting rights already vested under the plan and contributions already
made to the pension fund. If the company terminated or modified the plan, the company
would not be liable to any employee not having vested rights under the plan, see note 99
supra, nor would the employees have any diminution of their duties. 438 U.S. at 236-40.
Further, the employees would have no right of action against the company for termination
or modification of the plan. Thus, the pension plan does not satisfy Williston's definition of
a contract, because there is no legal sanction for the nonperformance of these duties. Since
performance of the apparent promise is optional with the promisor, this "contract" could be
construed as illusory. See Corbin, The Effect of Options on Consideration, 34 YALE L.J. 571
(1925); Patterson, Illusory Promises and Promisor's Options, 6 IowA L. BULL. 129 (1920).
191. The Court identifies the disruption of expectations based on the pension plan as the
impairment. 438 U.S. at 245-47. See note 191 supra.
192. The dissent noted that "the Act will impose only minor economic burdens on em-
ployers whose pension plans have been adequately funded." 438 U.S. at 253 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Only minor economic burdens should occur because contributions were to be
made based on actuarial predictions for all employees. Id at 237. The Pension Act did not
alter the amount to be contributed, but only superimposed a different vesting date, after
which unforeseen contingency could not be a basis to deprive pension fund benefits. Thus,
since the company had, at least theoretically, already made pension plan contributions for
these employees, there only would be minor economic burdens. Indeed, this burden could
be offset by the contributions the company had made to the plan for employees whose rights
would not vest, even under the ten-year Pension Act provision.
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more than it had expected to do, based on the contract, the Court held
the statute invalid as impairing the obligation of contract. 193
Had the Court used the traditional inquiry,194 rather than this con-
tractual expectations approach, it seems likely that the Pension Act
would not have been held to impair the obligation of contract. The
Pension Act did not prevent, or make unduly difficult, the performance,
by any party, of the duties undertaken by the contract. Rather, the
Pension Act created additional duties for one party to the contract, in-
dependent of the terms of the contract. 95 It was not the contract itself
that was significant in creating the duty, but the existence of the rela-
tionship between the employer and employee. It was the existence of a
specific relationship that enabled the Pension Act to be applied to the
company. In holding that the Pension Act violates the contract clause
because it changed the expectations of the parties,196 the Court has es-
tablished a novel and expansive interpretation of the clause, and ex-
tended it to protect expectation and reliance interests arguably related
to, but not themselves governed by a contract.
United States Trust, while using language of the "contractual expec-
tations" doctrine, 197 did not apply the doctrine in the manner used by
the Allied Court. United States Trust did not extend the inquiry be-
yond the contract terms. Rather, the inquiry focused on the actual
terms of the contract. The expectation inquiry, unlike that in Allied,
was not directed at what the parties expected their relationship would
be because of the contract, but rather, it was directed toward what
modifications the parties could have expected from legislative ac-
tions. "I In thus directing the inquiry, the United States Trust Court
193. Id. at 250-5 1.
194. See, e.g., City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965). The contract clause was
intended by the Framers to be applicable only to laws that altered the obligation of contract
by relieving one party to the contract of the obligation to perform a contractual duty. See
notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text.
195. Of course, it could be argued that the duty to pay additional money to the employee
pension plan was not independent of the contract, because the Pension Act adds these duties
based on an already existing plan. However, the Pension Act did not prevent either of the
parties to the contract from performing their duties. 438 U.S. at 256 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). The Act simply created additional duties, beyond those which the parties were bound
by contract to perform. See note 191 supra.
196. 438 U.S. at 250-51.
197. 431 U.S. at 19-21 n.17 ("a more particularized inquiry into the legitimate expecta-
tions of the contracting parties.").
198. Id. at 21.
The parties may rely on the continued existence of adequate statutory remedies for
enforcing their agreement, but they are unlikely to expect that state law will remain
entirely static. Thus, a reasonable modification of statutes governing contract remedies
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acted consistently with the Blaisdell interpretation of the contract
clause. Because, after Blaisdell, the question of whether the contract
clause had been violated could not be answered by merely showing an
impairment of contractual obligation, 199 the focus on expected changes
aided in determining if a statute impairing a contract was constitu-
tional. If the change could be shown to be reasonably expected by a
party when the contract was adopted, then no constitutional violation
would result from the impairment."° By focusing on the terms of the
contract and expected changes in those terms, United States Trust con-
tinues in the traditional contract clause approach, that the contract
clause protects from modification those things that the parties agree to
do.
The different applications of the expectation inquiry in United States
Trust and"Allied indicate the expansion of the contract clause in Allied
United States Trust continues to focus on the terms of the contract, and
on changes that could be expected to those terms, while Allied focuses
on the expectations of the parties that arise from their contractual rela-
tionship. The broader focus in Allied is certain to expand the reach of
contract clause prohibitions, particularly in those instances in which
social legislation creates additional duties on certain classes of persons.
The impact of this expanded reach can be seen most vividly in the em-
ployment area. Positive social legislation permeates the employment
area, continually adding to the duties of the employer.20 If this crea-
tion of additional duties can be shown to modify the expectations of the
employer,2 °z then the contract clause protections will be invoked.
The "expectations" inquiry adds yet another element to contract
clause analysis. This test is highly manipulable. The Court has enunci-
ated no standards by which it is to determine whether a particular piece
of legislation is expected. For example, with the Minnesota Pension
Act, Minnesota had enacted much legislation in the em-
ployee/employer field, and it could clearly be expected that they might
enact more. The Court does not say what makes this legislation unex-
pected. Further, it is likely that the most unexpected laws will be those
is much less likely to upset expectations than a law adjusting the express terms of an
agreement.
199. See, e.g., Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942); Veix
v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940).
200. 431 U.S. at 19-21 n.17.
201. Some examples are workers' compensation laws, minimum wage laws, state disabil-
ity insurance, and unemployment compensation.
202. 438 U.S. at 49-50. A law that requires an individual to pay more money than origi-
nally anticipated can invariably be construed as disrupting expectations.
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necessitated by emergency situations, and those that will satisfy the
Court's requirement of grave need for the legislation. These, however,
will fail to survive constitutional scrutiny under the "expectations" test.
Had the Allied Court continued to focus on the terms of the contract,
the results of the challenge to the Pension Act probably would have
been different. Because the Pension Act did not dilute or abrogate any
duties assumed by the parties in their contract, a traditional analysis
would probably find no impairment of contract within the meaning of
the contract clause. If the contract clause issue did not exist, either the
parties would have to challenge the legislation on another basis or the
suit would be dismissed. Most likely, the Pension Act would be chal-
lenged under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Under such a challenge, the Court, if acting consistently with due proc-
ess theories governing economic legislation, could only invalidate the
statute if it appeared arbitrary or irrational. The Court would be un-
able to escape the inevitable comparison between Allied and Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.203 Turner Elkhorn Mining involved na-
tional legislation that imposed unexpected, sudden and substantial lia-
bility on mine owners. The legislation was upheld despite the due
process challenge. In upholding the legislation, the Court noted that
even retroactive legislation, when subject to a due process challenge,
must stand unless the challenger can show it to be arbitrary or irra-
tional.2" Applying the Court's reasoning in Turner Elkhorn Mining to
the facts in Allied, it can be seen that the company in Allied, if alleging
a due process violation, would have to show that the statute was arbi-
trary or irrational. Decisions from the Court since the 1930's illustrate
the difficulty in carrying this burden.2"5 It is a rare situation when a
litigant can establish that the legislature had no rational basis for enact-
ing the challenged legislation. It can be assumed that in Allied the state
could have come forward and shown some rational basis for the Pen-
sion Act.2"6 All indications are that, had the Pension Act been chal-
lenged as violating due process, the challenge would have failed. Thus,
the expanded application of the contract clause can be seen to provide
203. 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
204. It is by now well established that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and bene-
fits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and that
the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legisla-
ture has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.
Id at 15.
205. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); North Dakota State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156 (1973); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726
(1963).
206. 438 U.S. at 247. "Yet there is no showing in the record before us that this severe
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greater protection for contract-related property rights than that pro-
vided by the traditional post-Blaisdell interpretation or by a due proc-
ess analysis.
Intimately related to the Court's expansive application of the con-
tractual expectations doctrine is the Allied Court's holding that an en-
largement of a contractual obligation can equal an impairment."' The
Court's protection of contractual expectations depends upon its holding
that enlargement of a contractual obligation may be an impairment. A
statute that diminishes or dilutes the expectations of the parties would
invariably negate or dilute some duty of a party assumed in the con-
tract terms. A statute that changes the parties' contractual expectations,
however, without changing the terms of the contract or without
preventing performance of contractual duties, will inevitably enlarge
the obligation of contract. Thus, the holding that an enlargement can
equal an impairment is necessary to give practical effect to the Court's
application of the contractual expectations doctrine.
The Allied Court was unable to rely on any authority emanating
from the Blaisdell era to support its holding that an enlargement equals
an impairment.20 8 Therefore, the Court was forced to obtain its sup-
port in earlier cases and could cite only two cases that embraced this
theory other than in dictum. 2 9 Detroit United Railway v. Michigan
21 °
and Georgia Railway & Power Co. v. Decatur"'l directly support the
disruption of contractual expectations was necessary to meet an important general social
problem." Id (emphasis added).
Although the majority asserts that there was no showing of need, the dissent, as well as the
district court and the Minnesota Supreme Court, found that the statute was needed to rem-
edy a social problem arising from the operation of private pension plans. Further, Congress
recognized the need for some legislative guidelines with private pension plans, and enacted
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1975).
The Minnesota Supreme Court decision, Fleck v. Spannaus, 251 N.W. 2d 334, 338 (Minn.
1977), the district court decision, Fleck v. Spannaus, 449 F. Supp. 644 (D. Minn. 1977)
(mem.), as well as the Supreme Court dissent, 438 U.S. at 251-56, all recognize that the
termination of operations by an employer can cause an employee to lose anticipated pension
benefits. See also Bernstein, Employee Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down: Problems
and Some Proposals, 76 HARV. L. REv. 952 (1963). When the Minneapolis-Moline Division
of White Motor Corporation closed one of its Minnesota plants, this problem of plant clo-
sure and pension plan termination was brought to the attention of the Minnesota Legisla-
ture. 449 F. Supp. at 651.
207. 438 U.S. at 244-45 n.16.
208. Id
209. See Hale, supra note 7, at 514-16. The Court cited eight cases as support for the
proposition that an enlargement of an obligation equals an impairment. Only two of these
cases, Detroit United Ry. v. Michigan, 242 U.S. 238 (1916), and Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v.
Decatur, 262 U.S. 432 (1923), embraced this theory in more than dicta.
210. 242 U.S. 238 (1916).
211. 262 U.S. 432 (1923).
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proposition that an enlargement is an impairment within the meaning
of the contract clause. Nevertheless, the strength of these two cases as
authority may be viewed212 as greatly diminished by the realization
that these cases are products of the substantive due process era,213 and
are contrary to an earlier interpretation that expressly disapproved of
the notion that an enlargement can equal an impairment.1 4 Both Geor-
gia Railway and Detroit United Railway involve railway companies
that had contracts with municipalities to provide service at a specified
rate within city limits. In both cases, after the contracts were made and
performance begun, the cities expanded their boundaries. The munici-
palities then insisted that, after expansion, the railway companies pro-
vide service at the contract rate to the annexed areas. In both cases the
Court held that forcing an extension of the contract rate to these an-
nexed areas impaired the obligation of contract by enlarging the obli-
gation.2 15 These holdings lent the needed support to the Allied
assertion that an enlargement equals an impairment.
Both cases, however, are distinguishable from Allied. Each involved
a contract to which the government was a party and the challenged
legislation was enacted in the government's interest. In such cases, as
was noted in United States Trust, it is appropriate that the Court take a
stricter view. The railway cases also reflect the popular attitude of their
time. Both cases were decided during the substantive due process era,
when the Court was extremely protective of property rights. The de-
cline of the substantive due process theories brought a substantial de-
cline in the protections of property rights, 216 and those declines make
the railway cases questionable authority. Further, Satterlee v. Matthew-
son, 2 17 an earlier contract clause case, expressly holds that an enlarge-
ment of obligation does not equal an impairment. Satterlee is more
directly applicable to the Allied case because Satterlee involves a stat-
ute that affected a contract between private individuals, while the other
two cases involve the state as a party to the contract. Because the state
was not a party to the contract, no stricter scrutiny was required. In
212. 438 U.S. at 259 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("These opinions reflect the then-pre-
vailing philosophy of economic due process which has since been repudiated.").
213. Detroit United Ry. was decided in 1916 and Georgia Ry. & Power was decided in
1923. See notes 209-11 supra. The substantive due process era was in full force between
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
214. Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380 (1829).
215. Detroit United Ry, v. Michigan, 242 U.S. 238, 253 (1916); Georgia Ry. & Power Co.
v. Decatur, 262 U.S. 432, 439 (1923).
216. See cases cited in note 201 supra. See also Strong, The Economic Philosophy ofLoch.
ner: Emergency Embrasure, and Emasculation, 15 ARz. L. REv. 419, 449-55 (1973).
217. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380 (1829).
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Satterlee, a Pennsylvania statute giving validity to a contract that was
invalid when made was not held to violate the contract clause. "[I]t is
not easy to perceive," said Justice Washington, "how a law which gives
validity to a void contract, can be said to impair the obligation of that
contract. ... [Ilt surely cannot be contended, that to create a contract,
and to destroy or impair one, mean the same thing."2 8 Since treating
something as a contract where none previously existed does not violate
the contract clause, it should follow that creating an obligation where
none previously existed does not violate the contract clause.21 9 If it is
found that the creation of the new obligation results in a deprivation of
property, the basis of the challenge to the statute causing this depriva-
tion should be the due process clause, not the contract clause.
The actual effect of the Court's holding, that an enlargement of obli-
gation can equal an impairment 220 of obligation, is almost certain to be
substantial. Legislation is continually adding to duties already existing,
particularly in the employment area.22' When legislative enactments
increase the duties the parties have undertaken by contract, or expecta-
tions they have derived from contract, the legislation will be vulnerable
to contract clause challenges.
IV. CONTRACT CLAUSE LITIGATION: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS
Allied and United States Trust put to rest speculation that the con-
tract clause is a "dead letter" of the Constitution. But these cases go
beyond that. Together they elevate property grounded in contract to a
favored status in the law, and provide more protection for this type of
property than property in other forms. This will undoubtedly increase
contract clause challenges to state legislation. Moreover, the expansive
theories of Allied will create a desire among litigants to have their prop-
erty considered a product of contract. Thus, litigants will be continu-
ally urging an expansive view of contract.
Another effect of these two cases will be inconsistent treatment of
property depending on what form that property takes and whether the
challenged legislation is a state or federal statute. Thus, individuals
218. Id at 412-13.
219. See Hale, supra note 7, at 514-16. See also 438 U.S. at 258-59 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
220. 438 U.S. at 244-45 n.16.
221. See id. at 255 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 243-44 (citing United States Trust Co.
v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)). See e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428
U.S. 1, 5 (1976) (suit challenging Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30
U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1970 & Supp. IV)).
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will feel a need to have a contract to ensure that their position is less
vulnerable to state legislation.
The future is actually uncertain in many areas. The Court could eas-
ily, in the next contract clause case, confine Allied to its facts, or find
the case was merely an instance of a statute being unconstitutional as
applied, rather than as being unconstitutional on its face. So long as
Allied remains as authoritative precedent, however, there will remain a
double standard in economic legislation, and the standard used will
depend on the form, rather than the substance, of property in a particu-
lar case.
Janet Irene Levine
